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Abstract 
This paper estimates the impact of a health insurance reform on health outcomes in urban China. 
Using the China Health and Nutrition Survey we find that this reform increases the rate of health 
insurance coverage significantly among workers in Non-State Owned Enterprises. The double 
difference (DD) estimations show that the reform also leads to better health outcomes: workers are 
less likely to get sick and more likely to use preventive care. Using an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach to look at the causal effect of health insurance, we find those with health insurance use 
more preventive care but do not report significantly better health outcomes, an increase in health 
care utilisation, or an increase in out-of-pocket medical expenditure. 
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1 Introduction 
Providing adequate health insurance to the majority of a country’s citizens in a cost-effective 
manner is a challenge faced by many countries. Given the uncertainty present in the market for 
health care and the lack of resources faced by individuals and governments in developing 
countries, the issue is even more acute for less-developed nations. Many developing countries are 
trying to use social insurance systems and payroll taxes to provide their citizens with equal access 
to health care (Hsiao & Fraker 2007). Indeed, around 50 percent of countries outside of the OECD 
finance the majority of health spending using public funds.
1
 In this paper we look at how China, 
one of the largest developing countries, expanded health care coverage to a significant proportion 
of its citizens working in urban areas and the effects that health care expansion had on 
self-reported health outcomes and the use of preventative care. The results outlined in this paper 
can provide insights for other large developing countries that are considering expanding health 
care coverage; the results show how health insurance, while being able to spread financial risks 
and prevent deprivation of care due to a patient’s inability to pay (Feldstein 2006), may lead to an 
increase in demand for services. 
In the early 1990s China had not established a comprehensive health insurance system for 
all of its citizens. In the urban areas, only employees of government-run facilities and Sate-Owned 
Enterprises (SOE) were covered. In rural areas, the old cooperative medical scheme had collapsed 
when the commune was broken up. The poor coverage in urban areas coupled with the downfall of 
rural coverage meant that the vast majority of the population did not have health care insurance; in 
fact, in 1998, only 9.5% of the rural population were insured (Liu 2004). Many people could not 
                                                 
1
 Wagstaff & Moreno-Serra (2009) provide a good review of health insurance systems in the developing 
countries. 
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afford basic health care and families were suffering from high medical expenses (Watts 2006). 
China sought to remedy the failures in the health care market by introducing reform aimed at 
expanding insurance coverage to all employees: both those working in SOEs and the private 
sector. In 1999 a new social insurance system for all urban works was established. In 2003, China 
re-established the cooperative medical system in rural areas and health insurance was expanded to 
cover the non-employed, children, the disabled, poor, and aged in urban areas. By the end of 2011, 
the coverage rate had reached 95% of the population. This paper will focus on the first major 
expansion, the Urban Employees’ Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI) Reform, that took place in 
1999 and was the impetus for the rest of the health care reforms. 
Despite the immense size of the health care expansion little work has been done to look at 
its effects in urban areas. Wagstaff et al. (2009a) and Lei & Lin (2009) examine the New 
Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) that involved the expansion of health care in rural areas. 
Both studies found no change in out-of-pocket spending and that there was some increase in the 
demand for health services, including preventative care. Wang et al. (2009) evaluated the impact 
of Rural Mutual Health Care (RMHC), a social experiment which was conducted in one of China’s 
western provinces from 2003 to 2006, and found it had a positive effect on the health status of 
participants. Wagstaff & Lindelow (2008) do look at the effect of insurance provision on ‘high’ 
spending on health care for both urban and rural areas using three surveys; two of which only 
sample rural households though. They find an increased risk of high and catastrophic spending 
with the introduction of health insurance. However, the closest study to ours is Liu & Zhao (2006) 
that looks at a pilot experiment conducted in Zhenjiang that found out-of-pocket expenditures 
increased for all groups.
2
 We will examine whether, in urban China, which tends to be richer and 
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 See Wagstaff et al. (2009b) for a summary of empirical studies examining health insurance and health system 
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more educated than its rural counterparts, the use of preventative care went up, health outcomes 
improved, and if, as it seems to be in the rural areas, out-of-pocket did not increase. 
Research on the provision or expansion of health insurance in other countries can provide 
insights into what we might expect to find in China. Currie & Cruber (1996) and Dafny & Gruber 
(2005) look at the expansion of Medicare in the US and found that take-up of medical services 
increased and led to lower child mortality and an improved efficiency of care for children who 
were eligible. Card, Dobkin & Maestas (2008) and Hadley & Waidmann (2006) find that the 
provision of Medicare leads to more visits to the doctor, positive effects on self-reported health 
status, and, for some groups, an increase in expensive procedures. Yip & Berman (2001) found the 
School Health Insurance Programme in Egypt increased visit rates and reduced the financial 
burden of use. Sepehri, Sarma & Simpson (2006) and Wagstaff (2007) examined health care 
provision in Vietnam and found that health insurance increased service utilization and reduced the 
risk of catastrophic spending but had not led to lower out-of-pocket expenditures. Chen & Jin 
(2012) provide some evidence that health insurance helped improve school enrolment of 
six-year-old children in rural China. Therefore, we expect to find that the expansion of health 
insurance in urban China likely led to an increase in utilization of services and had a positive effect 
on self-reported health status. However the potential effect on out-of-pocket expenses is 
ambiguous. 
To examine the effect of the UEBMI we will use difference-in-difference (DD) approach. 
Using longitudinal data, the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS)
3
, we find that, as 
                                                                                                                                                             
reforms in China. 
3
 This research uses data from China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). We should thank the National 
Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety, China Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Carolina Population Centre, 
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the NIH (R01-HD30880, DK056350, and R01-HD38700) and the 
Fogarty International Centre, NIH for financial support for the CHNS data collection and analysis files from 1989 to 
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expected, health insurance coverage in Non-State-Owned-Enterprises (NON SOE) significantly 
increased from 1997 to 2004. The DD estimates also suggest, people are less likely to report being 
sick and are more likely to utilize preventive care. However, we find no impact on health service 
utilisation or total medical expenditure. Besides looking at the DD estimates, though, we will also 
use an instrumental variable approach to get at the effect of the program on those individuals 
newly covered; we want to identify the causal effect of having health insurance on self-reported 
health and service utilization. The main difficulty in establishing causality arises from the 
endogeneity of the health insurance status and health outcomes. For example, adverse selection 
suggests that those who have higher risks in health are more likely to buy insurance. The UEBMI 
reform provided us with a plausibly exogenous variation to look at causal effect of providing 
health insurance in urban China. We instrument for “health insurance status" using the UEMBI 
reform. The estimates, like the DD results, suggest individuals who are newly covered are more 
likely to use preventative care and are less likely to report being sick. These benefits occur despite 
finding no evidence of an increase in demand for formal care or an increase in total medical 
expenditure for those who are newly covered. 
While we show that the expansion of health insurance in urban China led to a decrease in 
self-reported sickness and an increase in the use of preventative health care utilisation, we do not 
examine the costs required to achieve those benefits. Work in other countries have shown that 
health insurance actually increases medical expenditure. Manning et al. (1987) studies the RAND 
Health Insurance Experiment in 1974 and reports the role of insurance increases medical 
expenditure. Finkelstein (2005) investigates the effects of the introduction of Medicare in 1965; 
they found that the introduction of Medicare may explain at least 40 percent of the increase in real 
                                                                                                                                                             
2006 and both parties plus the China-Japan Friendship Hospital, Ministry of Health for support for CHNS 2009 and 
future surveys. 
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per capita health spending. Therefore whether health insurance provision should be expanded 
further in China or in other large developing countries depends on how policy makers view the 
benefits we are able to identify against the costs that may increase. 
The paper is organised as follows: in the next section, a background of health insurance 
reform in China is provided. Section 3 describes data and identification strategies. Section 4 
presents the main results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Health Insurance Reform in China 
China established its social medical insurance system for urban workers in the early 1950s. The 
system primarily consisted of two programmes. The first was the Labour Insurance Programme 
(LIP) which began in 1951 and aimed to provide free health care for all employees in SOEs. 
Beneficiaries received treatment at an assigned hospital or the company’s own facility and all 
health care expenses were covered by the SOE. The second was the Government Insurance 
Programme (GIP) which began from 1952 (Liu & Wang 1991) and provided free healthcare 
services to the people in government-run facilities, retired state officials, civil servants, social 
workers, academics and military personnel. The fees for any services were paid by government or 
paid by the patients first and then reimbursed by the government. 
In December of 1998, the Chinese government issued the Decision of State Council on 
Establishing Urban Employees’ Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI) System, a new social 
insurance system for all urban workers - not just those in SOEs or government-run facilities. The 
reform was set to start from the beginning of 1999 and was planned to be completed by the end of 
1999. The new programme expanded coverage to both public and private companies and it was 
supposed to be mandatory. The UEBMI was meant to, gradually, replace the GIP and LIP. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Self-employed and rural industry workers could participate in the UEBMI but it was not 
required. Instead of being free to users, like the GIP and LIP, employers and employees shared the 
costs of healthcare. Employers contributed 6 percent of the employees’ wage and the employees’ 
contribution was 2 percent.
4
 The total insurance premium was divided into two parts: a general 
medical trust fund and individual medical saving accounts. Roughly 70 percent of an employers’ 
contribution was put into the general medical trust fund while the rest was put into the individual 
medical saving account. The detailed proportions would be determined by the local government 
according to the employees’ age.5 
The general medical trust fund was used to pay for inpatient or chronic outpatient medical 
expenses. Individual medical saving accounts were used to pay for outpatient medical expenses 
that were not associated with a chronic illness. If an individual’s medical saving account was 
exhausted, the individual needed to cover the outpatient expenses out-of-pocket. The maximum 
medical expenditure paid by insurance each year was determined by local governments and 
individuals needed to pay the rest. Local governments (city and above) were responsible for the 
management of these two funds. Therefore, given the potential limits on coverage, while health 
insurance coverage is being expanded by UEBMI it is unclear if out-of-pocket expenses will stay 
the same or increase. 
Unemployed urban residents and dependents did not receive full coverage under UEBMI. 
Unemployed individuals were responsible for all medical costs or had to purchase their own 
commercial health insurance. Re-employment centres would pay 60 percent of the preceding 
                                                 
4
 The Decision of the State Council on Setting up Basic Medical Insurance System for Staff Members and 
Workers in Cities and Towns. State Council: December 14, 1998. 
5
 The Decision of the State Council on Setting up Basic Medical Insurance System for Staff Members and 
Workers in Cities and Towns. State Council: December 14, 1998. 
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year’s local worker’s average wage for the laid-off workers from SOEs that had been laid off due 
to industrial restructuring. Dependents of employees that had been covered under the old system 
(GIP and LIP) were eligible to have 50% of their health coverage paid for under UEMBI. 
However, dependents not only covered under the old system received no support under UEMBI. 
One non-employed group did receive health insurance, though; retirees received coverage and the 
cost of contributions for retired employees were covered by their former employees. 
From 1999 until the May 2003 the UEMBI was the primary policy governing health 
insurance provision in China. In May of 2003, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security of China 
enacted new rules to extend the population in the basic medical insurance system; self-employed 
people could take part in the system if they paid the premium themselves. In 2004, employees in 
Non-State Owned Organisations and Mixed-Ownership Enterprises were further covered by Basic 
Medical Insurance (BMI). From 2006, BMI extended its coverage to rural migrant workers. From 
2007, the Chinese government started the Urban Residents’ Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) 
system aimed at non-employed residents including children, disabled, poor, and aged in urban 
areas; premiums were paid by both individuals and governments. Therefore, given the frequency 
of household survey data in China and the constant changes from year-to-year after 2004, the best 
period to examine the effect of health care expansion in urban China is from 1999 until 2004 as it is 
the time when one clear policy was in place and the groups covered are well-known.
6
 
 
3 Data and Methodology 
For our main analysis we use the 1997 and 2004 waves of the China Health and Nutrition Survey 
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 See Wagstaff et al. (2009b) for a further discussion of salient facts regarding health insurance coverage in China 
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(CHNS) 
7
 and, for robustness checks, we will also examine the 1993 and 2000 waves. The CHNS 
is a repeated cross-sectional household survey that took place from 1989 to 2009. The survey 
covers nine provinces that were stratified by income (low, middle, and high) and where a 
multistage, random cluster process was used to draw the sample each year. 
We will use a difference-in-differences (DD) estimator to examine the effect of UEMBI on 
rates of insurance coverage, self-reported health status, health service utilization, preventative 
health care use, and out-of-pocket medical expenditure. The 1997 survey will serve as our 
pre-treatment (pre-UEMBI) wave and the 2004 survey will serve as our post-treatment 
(post-UEMBI) wave. As described above, UEMBI began in 1999 and was not fully implemented 
until the end of the year. Therefore, the 2000 wave is not likely to pick up any effect because the 
intervention might not be fully functioning by the time the 2000 survey took place. Likewise, as 
explained above, after 2005 yearly changes were made to insurance coverage in China. Therefore 
using any of the survey waves after 2004 will make it hard identify which, if any, health insurance 
provision had an effect. 
The use of the DD approach requires us to observe a treatment and control group over at 
least two time periods, pre and post-UEMBI for instance (see Wooldridge 2007). Since UEMBI 
focuses on providing insurance to non-SOE employees, they will be our treatment group as they 
are not covered in the first wave but are covered in the second wave. For the control group we have 
three options: retirees; SOE employees; and non-employed individuals. Given that retirees were 
partially covered under the UEMBI we have chosen not to use them. Likewise, over the period we 
are looking at there was a lot of economic and social transitions occurring at SOEs. Therefore, we 
do not want to use SOEs as the control group. If we look at unemployed individuals, they did not 
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 The data is available on the website: http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china 
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receive any insurance coverage over the time we are examining and there were no changes in the 
support they received. However, we know that they were looking for jobs and were in the labour 
market. This makes unemployed individuals the natural control group in this setting. 
One important assumption for using the DD approach is that the time trend of the treated 
group would have been the same as the control group in the absence of the UEMBI 
implementation. We will relax this slightly below by adding individual controls but, overall, we 
will assume that the assumption is correct given our sample is a subset of the labour force and 
facing the same support over the time period in question. However, we will be able to run some 
placebo tests and use the rural area to examine how likely it is that our assumption is correct. Given 
this set-up we aim to estimate the following: 
 
 
[ | = , = ] [ | = , = ]
[ | = , = ] [ | = , = ]
i i
i i
E Y T NONSOE P after E Y T NONSOE P before
E Y T Unemployed P after E Y T Unemployed P before

 
 (1) 
The result of DD estimate can expressed in a regression model. Consider the following regression 
equation: 
 , ,= *i t i t i i i tY T P T P         (2) 
where 
,i tY  is the health outcome of an individual and iT  equals one if the individual works in a 
Non-SOE, otherwise it is zero. tP  indicates pre and post-reform periods: tP  equals one after the 
reform and zero otherwise. i iT P  is an interaction term. The dummy variable iT  captures the 
possible differences between Non-SOE workers and the unemployed prior to the reform launch. 
The time period dummy variable, tP , captures the time trend. Given this set-up, the 
difference-in-differences estimate is actually: 
    ,2 ,1 ,2 ,1= nsoe nsoe u uy y y y     (3) 
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Since being employed in a Non-SOE or unemployed was not randomly assigned, we want to 
control for possible differences in the characteristics of the two groups. To do this we will use 
district fixed effects and individual covariates. This means that the identifying assumption is that, 
conditional on covariates, the time trend in the outcome variable would have been the same for the 
Non-SOE employees as it would have been for the unemployed. We will therefore estimate the 
following: 
 
, 0 1 2 3 , , ,= *i t i t i i i t i t i tY T P T P I F             (4) 
where 
,i tI  denotes a individual characteristics vector and ,i tF  denotes a district characteristics 
vector. In this model, the coefficient 3  is the estimate of interest. However, there is the potential 
that other factors, unrelated to the reform, might also affect health outcomes and lead us to 
incorrectly attribute changes to UEMBI. For instance, if employees in non-SOEs are generally 
becoming healthier because they are able to buy better food than the unemployed as China’s 
economy grows, we could get a DD estimate that is positive but that is not due to the reform. To 
test whether there is some time varying trend between non-SOEs and the unemployed that we are 
missing we add the rural areas to our analysis. 
While the rural area is not an ideal comparison for what might be going on in the urban 
areas, if the non-SOE sector is having a direct positive effect on health outcomes independent of 
the UEMBI policy, then we should see the trend in the rural area when we compare non-SOE 
employees to the unemployed. Unfortunately, while the rural areas were not affected by UEMBI, 
the new cooperative health care system (NCMS) did start in a limited number of rural areas in 
2003 and 2004. This could affect our estimation but if we look at 1 we can see that in our 2004 
survey there is not much evidence, if any, that the policy had begun to have an effect. Therefore, 
we will use the following to capture the DD estimate from the equation below: 
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, 0 1 2 3 0 1
2 3 ,
= * *
* * *
i t i t i i i i i
i t i i t i t
Y T P T P R R T
R P R T P
     
  
    
  
 (5) 
The coefficient of interest is still 3 . The iR  is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation 
is from a rural area and zero otherwise. As before, we will also add individual covariates and 
district fixed effects to control for possible differences in the two groups: 
 
, 0 1 2 3 0 1
2 3 , , ,
= * *
* * *
i t i t i i i i i
i t i i t i t i t i t
Y T P T P R R T
R P R T P I F
     
    
    
    
 (6) 
Where 3  is again the coefficient of interest and will tell us the net effect that UEBMI had on 
insurance coverage, self-reported health status, facility utilization, and out-of-pocket expenditures. 
While the UEBMI was meant to be mandatory, in practice far from everyone ended up being 
covered. Therefore, to compliment the DD approach, we will also use an instrumental variable 
approach to get at the effect of the treatment on the treated. The provision of UEBMI will be used 
to instrument for whether an individual had health insurance coverage. 
The empirical model can be summarised by the following two equations: 
 , 0 1 , 2 3 4
5 , ,
=
*
i t i t
i t i t
Y H NSOE After Rural
Rural After I F
    
   
   
   
 (7) 
, 0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 , ,
= * * * *
*
i t
i t i t
H NSOE After NSOE Rural Rural NSOE After
NSOE After Rural Rural After I F
   
      
  
      
 (8) 
where 
,i tH  denotes insurance status and ,i tH  denotes the predicted coverage. NSOE denotes the 
workers who worked in Non-SOEs. This approach involves two steps. In the first step, Equation 
1.8 estimates how health insurance status is affected by the reform. Then in the second step, 
Equation 1.7 the predicted health insurance status is used in the regression to see the effect of 
having taken up health insurance on the outcomes of interest. 
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4 Results 
4.1 The Effect of UEMBI on Health Insurance Coverage 
First we will examine how the implementation of UEMBI effected health insurance coverage in 
urban China. Not all individuals chose to take-up health insurance coverage. Those who felt they 
might have been at a low-risk of needing coverage or low-income groups that might have preferred 
to spend limited funds on other goods are likely to not have taken advantage of the health 
insurance that was supposed to be provided under UEMBI. However, there was demand for health 
insurance and a large group of people did take advantage of the state-supported system. 
 
Figure 1: The Trend of Health Insurance Coverage 
 
Figure 1 shows the health insurance coverage rate for our two main groups of interest: the 
urban unemployed and urban non-SOE employees. While insurance coverage among the urban 
unemployed increased slightly from 1994 to 1997 it stayed pretty much constant from 1999 until 
2004. However, in comparison, the health insurance coverage rate for the urban Non-SOE 
employees doubled from 15% to 30% after the reform despite having been level beforehand. To 
see if this difference in trends is due just to something particular about the non-SOE sector, we also 
show the rural unemployed and rural Non-SOE coverage rates over the same time period. The 
rural unemployed, like their urban counterparts, had roughly the same coverage rate over the entire 
period. The coverage in the rural Non-SOE group did go up somewhat but not to the same extent as 
in the urban sector; this is very likely due to the NCMS partially coming into effect in 2003 but we 
will examine the triple difference just to make sure there was a difference in the urban sector above 
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and beyond that in the rural sector. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable All 1997 2004 Differences in 
means 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. 
Err. 
Insurance 0.146 0.353 0.116 0.320 0.179 0.383 0.063*** 0.007 
Sick 0.099 0.298 0.051 0.221 0.150 0.357 0.099*** 0.006 
Health Service 
Uti. 
0.064 0.245 0.042 0.201 0.087 0.282 0.045*** 0.005 
Preventive Care 0.013 0.114 0.004 0.062 0.023 0.151 0.019*** 0.002 
Medical Exp. 46.55
4 
796.56
0 
17.30
6 
239.92
3 
78.05
8 
1119.90
6 
60.751**
* 
15.45
0 
Age 42.73
6 
14.489 40.97
2 
14.874 44.63
7 
13.815 3.665*** 0.279 
Years of 
Schooling 
6.315 3.938 5.757 3.949 6.915 3.837 1.158*** 0.076 
Female 0.534 0.499 0.527 0.499 0.541 0.498 0.0137* 0.010 
Non SOE 0.737 0.440 0.799 0.400 0.670 0.470 -0.129*** 0.008 
Rural 0.770 0.421 0.797 0.403 0.742 0.438 -0.055*** 0.008 
Rural*NonSOE 0.606 0.489 0.663 0.006 0.545 0.007 -0.055*** 0.008 
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Rural*Unemp 0.164 0.370 0.133 0.005 0.197 0.006 0.063*** 0.007 
Urban*NonSO
E 
0.131 0.337 0.136 0.005 0.125 0.005 -0.011* 0.007 
Urban*Unemp 0.099 0.299 0.067 0.003 0.133 0.005 0.066*** 0.006 
Observations 10633  5514  5119    
Column 7 shows the differences in means between 2004 and 1997. 
* Significant at 10% confidence level 
** Significant at 5% confidence level 
*** Significant at 1% confidence level 
 
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of key variables used in our analysis. 
The 1997 sample has 5,514 individuals and 2004 sample has 5,119. The first four variables are our 
outcomes of interest: insurance coverage; self-reported health status (whether the individual got 
sick in the previous 4 weeks); health care utilisation (whether the individual accessed any health 
care in previous 4 weeks); preventive care utilisation (whether the individual used any preventive 
care service); and the total out-of-pocket medical expenditure. Roughly 14.6% of our sample has 
insurance coverage; coverage increased from 11.6% in 1997 to 17.9% in 2004. The increase of 6.3 
percentage points is significant at 1 percent level, which can be found in Column (7). We also see 
that people were more likely to report being sick in 2004 than in 1997: in 1997 only 5.1% of the 
sample indicated they had been sick in the previous four weeks while, in 2004, 15% reported 
having been sick. 
Given the increase in self-reported sickness and the increase in insurance coverage, it is not 
surprising that we also see a significant increase in the health service utilisation. The increase of 
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health service utilisation, though, was not as large as the increase of reported sickness, which may 
suggest that some people chose self-care rather than formal care when they got sick. As with health 
service utilisation, the utilisation of preventive health care increases dramatically as well, though, 
from a very low base: in 2004, 2% of the sample used preventive health care in the last four weeks 
compared with 0.4% in 1997. Finally, we see that the average real total out-of-pocket medical 
expenditure increased by 351%, from 17.31 to 78.06 yuan. Using data from the National Health 
Survey (NHS), we see that this dramatic jump is not only in our data set. The NHS reports that the 
out-of-pocket expenses increased from 70% to 80% of per capita income in 1993 to more than 
200% in 2003 (Yip, Wang & Hsiao 2008). The remaining variables in Table 1 will serve as our 
control variables: the average age of the sample is 42; the average person has 6 years of schooling; 
53.4% of the sample is female; and 77% of the sample comes from rural areas. 
 
Table 2: Average Insurance Coverage (DDD) 
 Non-SOE Sample  Unemployed Sample   
Before 
the 
reform 
1997 
After 
the 
reform 
2004 
% point 
change 
Before the 
reform 
1997 
After 
the 
reform 
2004 
% point 
change 
DD effect 
After - Before, 
NonSOE-SOE 
Urban 0.134 0.295 0.161*** 0.137 0.142 0.005 0.156***  
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)  
Rural 0.109 0.181 0.072*** 0.120 0.122 0.002 0.070***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)  
DDD effect of Urban Health Insuanrce Reform 0.086** 
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Difference in Urban-Rural, after-before, Non SOE-SOE (0.04) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* Significant at 10% confidence level 
** Significant at 5% confidence level 
*** Significant at 1% confidence level 
 
We will now examine the trends in insurance coverage we saw in Figure 1. Table 2 
presents the simple difference-in-differences results. The table shows insurance coverage 
significantly increased by 16.1 percentage points in the urban area while there was no significant 
change among the unemployed. As we saw in the figure, insurance coverage did increase in rural 
areas for Non-SOE employees, by 7.2 percentage points, but the triple difference (Urban-Rural, 
After-Before, Non-SOE-SOE) is 8.6 which is significant at 5 percent confidence level. This 
suggests that if the difference in health insurance coverage between Non-SOE and the unemployed 
was increasing even before the introduction of UEBMI, the increase in the urban area was more 
than double the rate that is predicted by the trend from the rural area showing that the provision of 
UEMBI had a large effect. Indeed it is much more likely that NCMS was what caused insurance 
coverage to go up in the rural Non-SOEs and the effect of the UEMBI on insurance coverage is 
even higher than the triple difference estimate suggests. 
We now have strong evidence that UEMBI increased the coverage rate in urban areas, even 
above and beyond any trend that was occurring before the policy came into place. However, we 
will now push this assertion even further by seeing if it holds up when we control for individual 
covariates and if we run some placebo regressions. 
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Table 3: The Effect of Urban Health Insurance Reform on Insurance Coverage Rate 
 Urban Rural Urban&Rural 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
NonSOE -0.003 0.0075 0.053
6* 
-0.010
9 
-0.008
8 
0.016
8 
-0.003 0.0016 0.058
3** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03
) 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
NSOE*After 0.1561
*** 
0.1351
*** 
0.064
1* 
0.0698
*** 
0.0654
*** 
0.008 0.1561
*** 
0.1449
*** 
0.058
1* 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04
) 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
After 0.0048 -0.018
8 
0.006
7 
0.0024 0 0.034
5** 
0.0048 -0.006
8 
0.016
1 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03
) 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Rural*NSOE
*After 
      -0.086
3** 
-0.078
8* 
-0.045
1 
      (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
NSOE*Rural       -0.007
9 
-0.008 -0.044
5 
      (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Rural*After       -0.002
3 
0.0022 0.012
5 
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      (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Rural       -0.017
7 
-0.013
9 
-0.029
3 
      (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Baseline 
Controls? 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
District FE? No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 2444 2444 2444 8189 8189 8189 10633 10633 10633 
R squared 0.0326 0.0796 0.174
3 
0.0091 0.0292 0.242
5 
0.0181 0.0348 0.211 
Robust standard errors clustered at household level. Baseline control variables include i.age, 
i.school and female.Seven district fixed effects included in column 3,6 and 9 
* Significant at 10% confidence level ** Significant at 5% confidence level 
*** Significant at 1% confidence level 
 
Table 3 is a robustness check that shows the effects the reform on health insurance 
coverage. Columns (1), (2) and (3) use the urban sample. Even when we control for individual 
characteristics,
8
 health insurance coverage is estimated to have increased by 13.5 percentage 
points after the reform. However, including district fixed effects
9
 and individual characteristics 
causes our point estimate to decrease to 0.064, though, it is still significant at the 10% level. In the 
rural areas, though, we see that when individual controls and district fixed effects are included, as 
                                                 
8
 The control variables include gender, age, years of schooling in the form of dummy variables. 
9
 The reform allowed local flexibility in how it was implemented. Therefore the district fixed effects are 
important to use when looking at the whole sample 
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in column (6), there is no estimated impact of NSOE*After. The change in the coefficient when we 
use district fixed effects suggests that there was a lot of variation in how districts implemented the 
program, perhaps with some starting earlier and some later. 
Columns (7), (8), and (9) of table 2 use the whole sample. While columns (7) and (8) show 
that there was an increase in health insurance coverage for both rural and urban areas after the 
reform, column (9) shows that when controlling for district fixed effects and individual 
characteristics, that result was is only significant for the urban areas. Therefore, columns (3), (6), 
and (9) all provide a clear picture: UEMBI only significantly increased the health insurance 
coverage rate for non-SOE employees in urban areas. 
One final potential problem of the DD estimate that we will now look at is the fact that the 
method is based on the assumption that the “underlying trends" in the outcome variables are the 
same for both treatment and control group. A test to determine whether there is a trend before the 
reform among the groups is necessary. Since CHNS has many waves, tests of the trend are 
possible. As China started strong economic open policy reform in 1992, the waves before 1992 are 
not considered in order to simplify analysis. The placebo experiments use 1993, 1997, 2000 and 
2004 waves. The key idea of placebo experiments is to see whether there is any significant change 
for the groups that we are interested in when the reform could not plausibly be the explanation. For 
example, we could assume a reform occurred between 1993 and 1997 and run the same regressions 
as we did in table 2 above. If the estimate on NSOE*After is significant that would suggest the 
results we have above could be due to different underlying trends that were present between the 
two groups before the policy was implemented. If the estimate is insignificant or close to zero we 
will say there is no evidence of underlying trends. 
The results of the placebo experiment are given in table 3. Columns (1) - (3) show the 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
results of using the 1993 survey as the pre-treatment wave and the 1997 survey as the 
post-treatment wave. At no point is the coefficient of interest, the NSOE*After estimate, 
significant and, furthermore, the estimated coefficient is nearly zero. This means we find no 
evidence of a pre-intervention trend that could explain the results we found in the preceding tables. 
Columns (4) - (6) use the 1997 survey as the pre-treatment wave and the 2000 survey as the 
post-treatment wave. As in the preceding columns the coefficient of interest, the NSOE*After 
estimate, is insignificant suggesting that there is no evidence that trend differences before 2000 
could explain the results we find in the preceding tables. Finally, in columns (7) - (9) we use the 
2000 survey as the pre-treatment wave and the 2004 survey as the post-treatment wave. Given that 
the reform took place in 1999 and there was flexibility in implementing the program, these last 
three columns show that using 2000 as the base year provides roughly the same results as using 
1997. Indeed the estimated increase in health insurance coverage is 16.80 percentage points even 
when using district fixed effects and individual controls, more than we found previously. This 
suggests that our preferred specification could even be underestimating the effect of UEBMI on 
health insurance coverage. In summary, table 4 shows that there is no evidence of a differential 
pre-intervention trend that could explain our results and that the effects of reform are even robust 
to using a different pre-treatment survey closer to the 1999 start date. 
Figure 1 along with tables 2-4 provide strong evidence that the UEBMI reform increased 
insurance coverage for Non-SOE employees in the urban area anywhere from 7 to 16 percentage 
points. Initial coverage for Non-SOE employees in 1997 was 14% which means the reform 
increased coverage anywhere from 50% to over 100% for the target population. Despite this 
success, the programme still did not reach its goal of bringing universal coverage to Non-SOE 
employees in urban areas. Liu (2012) discusses the factors that influenced health insurance 
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coverage under the UEBMI and shows why UEBMI did not accomplish its goal. However, given 
the large and significant effect UEBMI had on insurance coverage we can use it as an exogenous 
shock to examine what effect an expansion of health coverage has in a large, developing country 
on many key outcome variables. 
 
Table 4: Placebo Experiments 
 93&97 97&00 00&04 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  
Rural*NSOE*
After 
0.050
5 
0.044
5 
0.0609 -0.01
45 
-0.00
78 
0.016
9 
-0.1251
* 
-0.1276
* 
-0.146
5** 
(0.068
7) 
(0.06
62) 
(0.064
8) 
(0.07
06) 
(0.07
06) 
(0.07
10) 
(0.0716
) 
(0.0708
) 
(0.070
1) 
NSOE*After -0.000
6 
0.001
9 
-0.015
7 
0.024
3 
0.019
4 
-0.01
75 
0.1850
*** 
0.1780
*** 
0.1680
** 
(0.065
7) 
(0.06
30) 
(0.061
8) 
(0.06
81) 
(0.06
82) 
(0.06
88) 
(0.0692
) 
(0.0684
) 
(0.067
9) 
NSOE*Rural -0.086
6* 
-0.06
99 
-0.091
3** 
-0.03
61 
-0.02
56 
-0.02
33 
-0.0506 -0.0365 0.0083 
(0.051
7) 
(0.04
89) 
(0.046
2) 
(0.05
15) 
(0.05
06) 
(0.04
98) 
(0.0560
) 
(0.0547
) 
(0.054
0) 
Rural*After -0.004
1 
0.010
6 
0.0121 -0.06
45 
-0.06
78 
-0.06
71 
0.0509 0.0567 0.0616 
(0.043 (0.04 (0.043 (0.04 (0.04 (0.04 (0.0424 (0.0424 (0.042
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8) 32) 8) 47) 51) 56) ) ) 3) 
NSOE 0.025
9 
0.017
3 
0.0556 0.025
2 
0.018
7 
0.040
6 
0.0495 0.0436 -0.016
3 
(0.050
0) 
(0.04
73) 
(0.044
8) 
(0.04
91) 
(0.04
88) 
(0.04
80) 
(0.0547
) 
(0.0534
) 
(0.052
5) 
Rural -0.016
2 
-0.01
89 
-0.031
8 
-0.02
03 
-0.01
18 
-0.02
94 
-0.0848
** 
-0.0755
** 
-0.087
4** 
(0.028
6) 
(0.02
82) 
(0.028
9) 
(0.03
41) 
(0.03
33) 
(0.03
42) 
(0.0368
) 
(0.0363
) 
(0.036
4) 
After 0.038 0.024
6 
0.0229 0.026
7 
0.025 0.034
8 
-0.0107 -0.0114 -0.003
5 
(0.039
5) 
(0.03
87) 
(0.039
8) 
(0.04
17) 
(0.04
22) 
(0.04
29) 
(0.0394
) 
(0.0391
) 
(0.039
2) 
Control No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Control FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 9000 9000 9000 9200 9200 9200 8759 8759 8759 
R Squared 0.025
3 
0.047
3 
0.1293 0.006
1 
0.024 0.159
3 
0.0307 0.0507 0.3084 
Column 1 to 3 using the data wave 1993 and 1997,after=1 if year==1997 
Column 4 to 6 using the data wave 1997 and 2000,after=1 if year==2000 
Column 7 to 9 using the data wave 2000 and 2004,after=1 if year==2004 
* Significant at 10% confidence level 
** Significant at 5% confidence level 
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*** Significant at 1% confidence level 
 
4.2 Difference-in-Differences Results 
We now want to see what effect the government imposed expansion in health insurance coverage 
had on standard health related outcomes that have been examined for other countries. We will 
focus on four key variables that we have already discussed: self-reported health (whether one 
reports having been sick in the last four weeks); health service utilisation (whether one went to 
formal care in the last four weeks); the use of preventative care (whether one received preventive 
health care in the last four weeks); and out-of-pocket medical expenditure (the total medical 
expenditure in the last four weeks for which one had to pay out-of-pocket). We will regress all four 
variables on the same set of covariates in the previous tables and focus on the same variable of 
interest, NSOE*After. The idea is that the estimated coefficient on NSOE*After will represent the 
effect of UEBMI, the health care expansion in urban China, on the key variables. 
 
Table 5: The Effect of Urban Health Insurance Reform on Health Outcomes (1997 and 2004) 
 Sick Health Service Utilization 
Urban Rural All Urban Rural All 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NonSOE 0.0262 -0.0008 0.0214 0.0105 -0.0001 0.0058 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
NSOE*After -0.0620** 0.0138 -0.0482* -0.0234 0.0034 -0.0181 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
After 0.1587** 0.0641** 0.1644*** 0.0645** 0.0328** 0.0651**
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* * * * * 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Rural*NSOE*Afte
r 
  0.0574*   0.0189 
  (0.03)   (0.03) 
NSOE*Rural   -0.0197   -0.0024 
  (0.02)   (0.02) 
Rural*After   -0.0980**
* 
  -0.0304 
  (0.02)   (0.02) 
Rural   0.0037   -0.0021 
  (0.01)   (0.01) 
Baseline Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2444 8189 10633 2444 8189 10633 
R Squared 0.1127 0.0702 0.0748 0.0948 0.0475 0.0473 
Column 1 and 4 using the data from urban area. 
Column 2 and 5 using the data from urban area. 
Column 3 and 6 using the data from both urban and rural area. 
* Significant at 10% confidence level 
** Significant at 5% confidence level 
*** Significant at 1% confidence level 
 
Table 5 shows the effect of UEBMI on self-reported health status (sick equals one if a 
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person reports being sick in the last four weeks) and health service utilization (which equals one if 
a person reports having used a formal health care facility in the last four weeks). Column (1) shows 
that that urban employees who worked in Non-SOEs were 6.2 percentage points less likely to 
report being sick after the reform even when we include individual controls and district fixed 
effects. This represents a 41% decrease in the reporting rate for 2004. For comparison we include 
the rural sample in column (2) and see that there was no effect of the on self-reported health. 
Finally in column (3) we use the overall sample and all controls and again find that the effect is 
only present for the Non-SOE employees in urban areas after the reform took place. Columns (4) - 
(6) show the effect on health service utilization in the urban and rural areas. In all three 
specifications there is no evidence that the program increased the use of formal health care 
facilities; the estimated effect varies between -0.023 and -0.018 for the variable of interest. While 
the UEBMI does not seem to have increased health service utilization it does appear that in our 
timeframe, for all of China, utilization was increasing by over 6 percentage points demonstrated by 
the estimated coefficient on the After variable. 
 
Table 6: The Effect of Urban Health Insurance Reform on Health Outcomes (1997 and 
2004)(Cont.) 
 Preventive Health Care Medical Expenditure 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
NonSOE 0.0059 -0.0017 0.001 -65.2114 -10.3722 -22.1368 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (55.73) (11.26) (30.97) 
NSOE*After 0.0209 0.0006 0.0267** -61.2677 -59.9518 -96.8474 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (68.46) (52.03) (87.34) 
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After 0.0228** 0.0112** 0.0213** 141.5975** 80.5977 177.4785** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (63.52) (55.16) (82.21) 
Rural*NSOE*After   -0.0278*   50.0866 
  (0.01)   (107.01) 
NSOE*Rural   -0.0003   -2.1029 
  (0.01)   (30.00) 
Rural*After   -0.0083   -109.792 
  (0.01)   (100.53) 
Rural   -0.0035   -0.8328 
  (0.01)   (28.29) 
Baseline Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2444 8189 10633 2444 8189 10633 
R Squared 0.0492 0.022 0.028 0.0376 0.014 0.0126 
Column 7 and 10 using the data from urban area. Column 8 and 11 using the data from urban area. 
Column 9 and 12 using the data from both urban and rural area. 
* Significant at 10% confidence level 
** Significant at 5% confidence level 
*** Significant at 1% confidence level 
 
Table 6 examines the effect of UEBMI on preventative health care (which equals one if a 
person reports having received preventative health care in the previous four weeks) and medical 
expenditure (which is the total amount a person had to pay out-of-pocket, in RMB, for medical 
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expenditures during the past four weeks). As shown in the summary statistics few people use 
preventative health care, less than one percent. In column (7) we have an estimated increase of two 
percentage points - which would represent a more than 200% increase in utilization of preventative 
care - due to the programme however the point estimate is not significant at the 10% level (it is 
only significant at the 12% level). However, when we look at column (8) we see that in the rural 
area we have an extremely small estimate that is far from significant. When we combine the 
sample and use all controls in column (9) we again get an estimated increase in over two 
percentage points for Non-SOE employees in urban areas and no effect for employees in rural 
areas. In this case the point estimate is significant; we are gaining precision because the larger 
sample is being used to identify the same number of baseline controls. This suggests that we have 
some evidence that the program did have a large effect on the use of preventative care. However, 
as seen in column (10) - (12) we find no effect of the program on out-of-pocket expenditures. We 
do find that over time out-of-pocket expenditures were increasing quite significantly, by over 
RMB 177. 
Therefore, we get a clear picture from the DD estimates: the rollout of the UEBMI led 
Non-SOE employees in urban areas to use more preventative care and be less likely to report they 
had been sick. However there was no increase in the use of formal health facilities or out-of-pocket 
expenditure caused by the UEMBI. Therefore, there is evidence that UEMBI had a positive effect 
on the health of some urban Chinese workers while not raising direct costs to patients or increases 
demand for formal services. This improvement in health seems to have come through the increased 
use of preventative care. 
 
4.3 Instrumental Variables 
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In this section we will look at the effect of providing health insurance to a Non-SOE worker in 
urban China using an instrumental variable (IV) technique. Since the reduced form (the DD 
estimates) shows that the UEMBI had an effect on health insurance coverage we can use the 
reform as an instrument for health insurance. The choice to have health insurance is endogenous, 
people who need insurance are more likely to choose to become covered. Therefore when we 
regress health insurance coverage on our outcomes of interest we may find that having health 
insurance coverage causes an increase in sickness for instance. This could very easily be due to 
adverse selection and not the program though. 
UEBMI did increase insurance coverage but it was only by 6 percentage points. We know 
that the likelihood of reporting sickness decreased by two percentage points in urban areas, but 
what was the overall effect on workers who actually got coverage? The instrumental variable 
approach will scale our results and show us the causal effect of health insurance coverage on 
someone who actually received coverage. These estimated effects will obviously be larger than the 
DD estimates but so will the standard errors. Therefore, it is unclear if we will have enough 
precision to estimate all effects of the UEBMI. 
 
Table 7: The Effect of Health Insurance on Health Outcomes(IV) 
 Sick Health Service Utilization 
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Insurance 0.0284*
** 
-0.2388* 0.0220*
* 
-0.2851 0.0057 -0.1606 0.0036 -0.1504 
(0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.19) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.15) 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
Non SOE 0.0165*
* 
0.0293*
** 
0.0016 0.0148 0.0104* 0.0184*
* 
0.001 0.0076 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
After 0.1384*
** 
0.1574*
** 
0.1369*
** 
0.1494*
** 
0.0558*
** 
0.0677*
** 
0.0555*
** 
0.0617*
** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Rural -0.0127 -0.0201* -0.0083 -0.0278* -0.0062 -0.0108 -0.0032 -0.013 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Rural*Aft
er 
-0.0655*
** 
-0.0714*
** 
-0.0644*
** 
-0.0644*
** 
-0.0205
* 
-0.0242
** 
-0.0205
* 
-0.0205
* 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Baseline 
Controls? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District 
FE? 
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observati
ons 
10633 10633 10633 10633 10633 10633 10633 10633 
First 
Stage F 
statistics 
 15.14  8.4  15.14  8.4 
R squared 0.0639 -0.0329 0.0749 -0.0295 0.0385 -0.0174 0.0472 0.0081 
* Significant at 10% confidence level 
* Significant at 5% confidence level 
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*** Significant at 1% confidence level 
 
The main IV regressions are presented in the Table 7 and Table 8 and examine the same 
four outcomes of interest we looked at in the preceding subsection. Columns (1) and (3) show the 
OLS results. Consistent with a story of adverse selection, we find that people who have health 
insurance are more likely to report being sick in the past four weeks. However, when we 
instrument for insurance using UEMBI, we find that the causal effect of insurance: a person with 
health insurance is, roughly, 20 percentage points less likely to report being sick in the past four 
weeks. This number is large but is imprecisely estimated. What we can clearly say, though, is that 
there is evidence that having health insurance leads to a decrease in sickness. However, we need to 
be consider the strength of the instrument. 
At the bottom of table 7 and table 8 we see the F-Stats for the excluded instrument, 
NSOE*After. The first stage regressions are the same as those showed in columns (7) and (8) in 
table 3 above. When the F-stat is below 10 there is the potential for weak instruments which is also 
when the standard errors get even larger. For the IV estimates where district fixed effects are not 
used we have a strong instrument and a large F-stat of 15.14. However, since the district fixed 
effects explain a lot of the variation in insurance coverage, when we include them in the IV 
estimates, the F-stat drops to 8.4. When we include district fixed effects our point estimates in the 
IV do not change much but the standard errors do get larger suggesting that we are losing precision 
but likely getting at the same estimated causal effect as when we had the F-stat of 15.14. Therefore, 
even though the F-stat is below 10, we are not too worried about weak instruments in our results. 
In columns (5) and (7) of table 7 we see the OLS regressions for health service utilization. 
In columns (6) and (8) we see their IV counterparts. In all four specifications we find no effect of 
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health insurance on the use of formal health care facilities. The F-stats for the IV regressions are 
the same as when we looked at sickness because we are using the same sample. 
 
Table 8: The Effect of Health Insurance on Health Outcomes(IV Cont.) 
 Preventive Healthcare Medical Expenditure 
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Insurance 0.018*
** 
0.183*
** 
0.013*
** 
0.266*
** 
24.246 -685.177
* 
20.959 -695.606 
(0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.09) (30.72) (353.42) (39.03) (520.50) 
Non SOE 0.004 -0.004 0.005 -0.006 -57.720*
* 
-23.631 -60.608*
* 
-29.896 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (28.82) (26.44) (27.73) (30.47) 
After 0.035*
** 
0.023*
** 
0.034*
** 
0.024*
** 
122.998
*** 
173.579*
** 
123.475
*** 
152.588
*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (46.37) (42.84) (45.74) (40.43) 
Rural -0.002 0.003 -0.004 0.012* 3.057 -16.393 4.796 -40.772 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (13.21) (29.77) (14.57) (43.39) 
Rural*Aft
er 
-0.023*
** 
-0.019*
** 
-0.022*
** 
-0.022*
** 
-94.134* -109.790
*** 
-94.376* -94.284*
* 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (49.19) (39.56) (49.02) (38.51) 
Baseline 
Contr.? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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District 
FE? 
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observati
ons 
10633 10633 10633 10633 10633 10633 10633 10633 
First 
Stage F 
statistics 
 15.14  8.4  15.14  8.4 
R squared 0.0249 -0.2281 0.0278 -0.4577 0.0117 -0.0842 0.0124 -0.0674 
* Significant at 10% confidence level 
** Significant at 5% confidence level 
*** Significant at 1% confidence level 
 
In table 8 we present the results of the OLS and IV regressions of having health insurance 
on the use of preventative health care and out-of-pocket medical expenditures. The OLS results in 
columns (9) and (11) show that a person with health insurance is more likely to use preventative 
care. However when we look columns (10) and (11) we see that the IV estimates are magnitudes 
larger and significant at the 1% level. Indeed the IV estimates suggest that someone with health 
insurance is 27 percentage points more likely to use preventative health care than someone without 
coverage. This large effect could easily be due to moral hazard in the health market as discussed by 
zeckhauser1970medical; if individuals do not bear the full cost of medical expenses they will use a 
service more than if they did bear the full costs. While we did not see this with regards to formal 
medical care this increase in preventative care could be due to the 2003 breakout of SARS, which 
was shortly before the second survey wave. When SARS hit people may not have gone to formal 
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health care facilities but instead likely became more consciousness and started using preventative 
care. What these regressions show us is that those with health insurance used preventative care at 
that period much more than those without insurance. 
Columns (13) to (16) in table 8 examine the effect of health insurance on out-of-pocket 
expenditures. The OLS estimates in (13) and (15) show a very small, insignificant increase in 
expenditure due to health insurance. Columns (14) and (16) show a large, negative effect of having 
health insurance, however, the effect is only marginally significant in column (14). These results 
are consistent with the other results in this section: out-of-pocket costs for medical care have gone 
down and as a result people use preventative care more. However, the estimated effects on 
expenditure are imprecise and only significant in one specification. 
The instrumental variable regressions shows us that a person with health coverage is over 
20 percentage points less likely to report being sick and nearly 19 percentage points more likely to 
use preventative health care, an immense improvement over the average 2% usage rate observed in 
the population. This implies there are large benefits to those individuals who were newly covered 
by health insurance due to UEMBI. These results are consistent with the DD estimates but provide 
a rescaling of the results to see the causal effect of having health insurance on the newly insured. 
 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyse the impact of the UEBMI health insurance reform in China on coverage 
and health outcomes. The results show that the insurance reform significantly increased health 
insurance coverage among the target group in urban areas. However, the coverage was only 
around 30% for all eligible citizens in 2004, which suggests it was still far from reaching its stated 
goal of helping to achieve universal coverage. Although the insurance programme was meant to be 
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mandatory for all urban employees, during the first five years of the reform, there were some 
enterprises and individuals who chose not participate. There was poor monitoring of the 
programme and punishments were not strict enough in the early years of the reform. Therefore, 
with high worker turnover, employers chose to underinvest in health (Fang & Gavazza 2007). 
Despite the failure of UEMBI to make health care universal, the DD results show it did 
play a large part in causing Non-SOE employees to become insured: insurance among the target 
group increased by more than 50%. The jump in insurance coverage led to an increase in the use of 
preventative health care and a decrease in the likelihood of being sick. The IV estimates show us 
that individuals who were newly covered due to UEMBI were less likely to report being sick and 
that 21% of them used preventative health care. These benefits accrued without causing 
out-of-pocket medical expenditures or demand on services from formal medical facilities increase. 
These results show that large, developing countries, like China, can introduce health 
insurance without appearing to drive up out-of-pocket expenditures or demand for formal services. 
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Highlights 
 We analyse the impact of the Urban Employees Basic Medical Insurance health insurance 
reform in China on coverage and health outcomes. 
 The results show that the insurance reform significantly increased the rate of health 
insurance coverage among the workers in Non-State Owned Enterprises in urban areas. 
 The double differences (DD) estimations show that the reform also leads to better health 
outcomes: workers are less likely to get sick and more likely to use preventive care. 
 Using an instrumental variable (IV) approach, we find those with health insurance use 
more preventive care but do not report significantly other better health outcomes. 
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